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Abstract
A critical re-examination of the double-slit experiment and its
variants is presented to clarify the nature of what Feynmann called
the “central mystery” and the “only mystery” of quantum mechan-
ics, leading to an interpretation of complementarity in which a ‘wave
and particle’ description rather than a ‘wave or particle’ description is
valid for the same experimental set up, with the wave culminating in
the particle sequentially in time. This interpretation is different from
Bohr’s but is consistent with the von Neumann formulation as well as
some more recent interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Keywords: wave-particle duality, complementarity, central mystery, quantum
mechanics
1 INTRODUCTION
Thomas Young is believed to have carried out his famous double-slit exper-
iment with light in 1801. It was one of the key experiments that helped
∗partha.ghose@gmail.com
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overthrow the corpuscular theory of light favoured by Newton and estab-
lish the wave theory favoured by Christiaan Huygens and Augustin Fresnel.
However, when classical light was replaced by single-photon/particle sources
and detectors in the 20th century, the old wave-particle controversy was re-
vived because it revealed a mysterious dual character of light. According to
Feynman it contains “the heart of quantum mechanics. In reality, it contains
the only mystery. We cannot make the mystery go away by explaining how
it works . . . ” [1]. Much has been written on this mystery both techni-
cally, in text books and in popular literature. The statements made by the
founding fathers of quantum mechanics like Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and
von Neumann who held different positions, heighten the mystery.
The purpose of this paper is to bring together some of these conflicting
points of view not usually found in pedagogical texts, together with some
comments made by later reputed thinkers like Richard Feynman, John Bell
and Roger Penrose, in order to arrive at an informed and consistent under-
standing of the mystery that still persists in spite of much later work such as
welcher-weg experiments [2], delayed-choice experiments [3] and theoretical
interpretations involving hidden variable theories [4], path-integrals [5], many
worlds [6], consistent histories [7] and decoherence [8]. No attempt is made,
however, to cover all these important areas of later work in foundations of
quantum mechanics including quantum information processing. The empha-
sis is rather on making clear what the central and only mystery of standard
quantum mechanics really is, using the familiar double-slit experiment and
its variants, and thus motivating these later developments.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the double-slit
experiment and discusses Bohr’s original interpretation of wave-particle dual-
ity in terms of his Complementarity Principle and also mentions Heisenberg’s
interpretation in terms of the uncertainty principle. Section 3 deals with von
Neumann’s formulation of quantum mechanics which is different from the
Bohr-Heisenberg formulation and which led to the notorious ‘measurement
problem’. In section 4 the double-slit experiment is revisited together with
modern variants of it such as welcher-weg experiments, delayed-choice exper-
iments and quantum erasures to prepare the ground for Section 5 in which an
interpretation of complementarity that is different from Bohr’s but consistent
with von Neumann’s formulation as well as some more recent interpretations
of quantum mechanics is developed and spelt out without, of course, solving
the mystery which persists in spite of many claims and counterclaims.
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2 THE DOUBLE-SLIT EXPERIMENT: COM-
PLEMENTARITY AND UNCERTAINTY
An example of sound popular exposition of the double-slit experiment based
on interpretations by some of the founding fathers of quantum mechanics
such as Bohr is the following quotation [9]:
When a beam of monochromatic light is shone through two nar-
row holes in a screen, the light spreading out from the two holes
interferes, just like ripples interfering on the surface of a pond, to
produce a characteristic pattern on a second screen.
The mystery is that light can also be described as a stream of
particles, called photons. The light source in a Young’s slit ex-
periment can be turned down to the point where it consists of
individual photons going through the experiment, one after the
other. If the spots of light made by individual photons arriving
at the second screen (actually a photoelectric detector) are added
together, they still form an interference pattern, as if each pho-
ton goes through both holes and interferes with itself on the way
through the experiment.
Any attempt to determine which hole the photon goes through, however,
destroys the interference pattern. A formal way of seeing this without invok-
ing the uncertainty principle is to write the normalized state of the photon
after passage through the double-slit as a coherent superposition of the two
normalized states generated by the two slits (Fig. 1),
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|ψ〉S1 + eiθ|ψ〉S2]. (1)
where θ is the phase difference between the two states. The interference
between the states is then given by
〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1 + S2〈ψ|ψ〉S1cosθ. (2)
The variation of the phase difference θ along the second screen produces an
interference pattern on it characteristic of wave propagation. If detectors are
placed to observe which path the photon definitely takes, then the state of
the photon plus the detectors becomes
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Fig. 1 The double-slit set up with two slits S1 and S2 in a screen S
|φ〉 = 1√
2
[|φ〉S1 |D1〉+ eiθ|φ〉S2|D2〉]. (3)
Each of the detectors Di (i = 1, 2) fires 50 per cent of the time and they
always do so in anti-coincidence. In each of these cases it is usually claimed
that it is possible to trace the path of the photon from the slit whose associ-
ated detector fired back to the source. In all these cases the photon certainly
did not pass through the other slit. Since the state of the detector that fired
is orthogonal to that of the detector that did not fire,
〈φ|φ〉 = 1 (4)
and the interference term disappears. This is usually taken to imply that
there is no observable evidence of wave-like behaviour in these cases. Bohr
[10] writes,
This point is of great logical consequence, since it is only the cir-
cumstance that we are presented with a choice of either tracing
the path of a particle or observing interference effects, which al-
lows us to escape from the paradoxical necessity of concluding
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that the behaviour of an electron or a photon should depend on
the presence of a slit in the diaphragm through which it could be
proved not to pass. We have here to do with a typical example
of how the complementary phenomena appear under mutually
exclusive experimental arrangements (cf. p. 210) and are just
faced with the impossibility, in the analysis of quantum effects,
of drawing any sharp separation between an independent
behaviour of atomic objects and their interaction with
the measuring instruments which serve to define the condi-
tions under which the phenomena occur. (bold face type added)
This is the essence of Bohr’s Complementarity Principle as applied to the
double-slit arrangement in which one observes either a double-slit interference
pattern on the second screen characteristic of wave-like propagation when
both the slits are open, or the absence of it when detectors are placed near
the slits, which is taken to be characteristic of particle-like behaviour. The
description of the photon thus depends on whether both the slits are kept
open so that in principle no path information is available, or detectors are
placed near the slits so that in principle ‘which-path’ information is available.
This is the basis of ‘wave-particle duality’ – in a double-slit arrangement one
can consistently describe an atomic object either as a wave or as a particle
but never both simultaneously in the same experimental set up. There is
no ontological duality in the object itself, its behaviour being determined by
its ‘inseparable’ interaction with the measuring instrument. In Bohr’s words
[11],
Complementarity: any given application of classical concepts pre-
cludes the simultaneous use of other classical concepts which in
a different connection are equally necessary for the elucidation of
the phenomena.
Another important feature of the measuring apparatus, according to Bohr,
is its classical nature. According to him [12],
The experimental conditions can be varied in many ways, but
the point is that in each case we must be able to communicate to
others what we have done and what we have learned, and that
therefore the functioning of the measuring instruments must be
described within the framework of classical physical ideas. (italics
added)
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Thus, not only is it impossible to draw any sharp separation between inde-
pendent atomic objects and the measuring instruments, the latter must func-
tion classically. Since, according to Bohr, the description of observations and
communication with others must both be in the language of classical physics,
one might ask: where is the room for non-classical behaviour? Bohr’s answer
is: it lies in the Complementarity Principle. Armed with such a principle,
Bohr is believed to have been able to interpret wave-particle duality, not as
an ontological duality which would be self-contradictory in classical/ordinary
language, but as a duality of behaviours under mutually exclusive experimen-
tal conditions. Hence, Bohr’s use of the word ‘complementarity’ is not to be
confused with complementarity in the usual sense of the word. Einstein had
problems in understanding Bohr’s formulation of this principle. He wrote
[13],
Despite much effort which I have expended on it, I have been
unable to achieve the sharp formulation of Bohr’s principle of
complementarity.
On the other hand, John Bell who, like Einstein, was known for his strong
advocacy of a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, offered the fol-
lowing sympathetic and interesting interpretation of Bohr’s nonrealist point
of view [14] :
It seems to me that Bohr used this word with the reverse of its
usual meaning. Consider for example the elephant. From the
front she is head, trunk and two legs. From the back she is bot-
tom, tail, and two legs. From the sides she is otherwise, and
from the top and bottom different again. These various views
are complementary in the usual sense of the word. They sup-
plement one another, they are consistent with one another, and
they are all entailed by the unifying concept ‘elephant’. It is my
impression that to suppose Bohr used the word ‘complementary’
in this ordinary way would have been regarded by him as missing
his point and trivializing his thought. He seems to insist rather
that we must use in our analysis elements which contradict one
another, which do not add up to, or derive from, a whole. By
‘complementarity’ he meant, it seems to me, the reverse: contra-
dictoriness. Bohr seemed to like aphorisms such as ‘the opposite
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of a deep truth is also a deep truth’; ‘truth and clarity are com-
plementary’. Perhaps he took a subtle satisfaction in the use of
a familiar word with the reverse of its meaning.
‘Complementarity’ is one of what might be called the ‘roman-
tic’ world views inspired by quantum theory. It emphasizes the
bizarre nature of the quantum world, the inadequacy of everyday
notions and classical concepts. It lays stress on how far we have
left behind naive 19th century materialism.
This was regarded by some as the new ‘conceptual enlightenment’ brought
about by Bohr of the abstract mathematical structure of quantum mechan-
ics developed by the Go¨ttingen school led by Born, Jordan and Heisenberg
with Schro¨dinger, Dirac and Pauli joining in. In spite of all this impressive
mathematical innovation none had however succeeded to describe so simple
a phenomenon as the path of an electron in the cloud chamber.
Heisenberg, however, sought the answer to the problem in a different
direction from Bohr, namely in terms of his uncertainty relation ∆x∆p ≥
~/2. This is how he describes the situation [15]
I had meanwhile been so far educated by the Go¨ttingen math-
ematical school as to assume that, through logical application
of the quantum-mechanical formalism, conclusions must also be
inferrable as to he remainder of the old concepts that would sur-
vive in the new language. But Bohr wanted to set out from the
two initially contradictory pictures of the wave and the corpuscu-
lar theories, and to push on from thence to the correct concepts.
The answer was then, as you know, made possible by reversing the
statement of the problem; the question was no longer to be, “How
do we represent the path of the electron in the cloud chamber?”;
instead, we had to ask, “Are there, perhaps, in the observation of
nature, only such experimental situations as can be represented in
the mathematical formalism of quantum theory?” Is it, in other
words, correct, as Einstein once maintained against me, that the-
ory first decides what can be observed? The answer could then be
given in the form of the uncertainty-relation. The concept of path
may be used only with the degree of inexactness characterised by
the fact that the product of the uncertainty of position and the
uncertainty of the associated momentum cannot be smaller than
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Planck’s quantum of action. Bohr had arrived at the same lim-
itations of language by way of the concept of complementarity
formulated by him, and only now was it possible to state clearly
what we are to understand by an observation-situation, and how
it is represented in the mathematical formalism. Pauli at once
concurred in this interpretation.
3 THE VON NEUMANN FORMULATION
An unsatisfactory feature of the Bohr interpretation is its insistence that
‘the very small and the very big must be described in very different ways,
in quantum and classical terms respectively’ [16]. This in spite of the fact
that there is no intrinsic scale within quantum theory to distinguish the
very small from the very big. It also requires the old classical physics even
to define the new theory which is supposed to replace it. Furthermore, a
classical apparatus is supposed to be made up of atomic constituents which
must themselves behave quantum mechanically to be consistent. How can
then an apparatus behave classically? As John Bell put it, the ‘apparatus
should not be separated off from the rest of the world into black boxes, as if
it were not made of atoms and not ruled by quantum mechanics’ [17].
John von Neumann had realized all this much earlier and sought to alter
this situation by introducing a different ‘romantic’ world view into physics in
which the essential distinction is not between the very small and the very big
but between ‘matter’ and ‘mind’ [18].1 He did this by bringing all physical
systems, the very small and the very big, including the measuring apparatus,
within the realm of quantum mechanics. With this world view in mind von
Neumann introduced two different processes, the usual Schro¨dinger process
of evolution of the ψ-function which is unitary and reversible and univer-
sally applicable to all things material and physical, small and big (which he
called ‘process 2’), and a new process which he called ‘process 1’ (also called
‘collapse’ or ‘reduction’ of the ψ-function) which is essentially non-quantum
mechanical, non-unitary, irreversible, and extra-physical and perceptual and
not reducible to the physical environment. This is an aspect of von Neu-
mann’s ‘process 1’ that is often overlooked in the literature, and therefore
needs to be emphasized. Another important technical point to emphasize
about ‘process 1’ is that it changes a non-diagonal density matrix of a pure
state into a ‘reduced’ density matrix of a mixed state that is diagonal and
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whose diagonal terms can be interpreted as probabilities. This is achieved
by means of the ‘projection postulate’ which is the mathematical expression
for ‘process 1’. To quote von Neumann [18]:
The difference between these two processes U → U ′ is a very
fundamental one: aside from the different behaviors in regard
to the principle of causality, they are also different in that the
former is (thermodynamically) reversible, while the latter is not
(cf. V.3).
Let us now compare these circumstances with those which actu-
ally exist in nature or in its observation. First, it is inherently
entirely correct that the measurement or the related process of
the subjective perception2 is a new entity relative to the physical
environment and is not reducible to the latter. Indeed, subjective
perception leads us into the intellectual inner life of the individ-
ual, which is extra-observational by its very nature (since it must
be taken for granted by any conceivable observation or experi-
ment). . . . Nevertheless, it is a fundamental requirement of the
scientific viewpoint - the so called principle of the psycho-physical
parallelism - that it must be possible to describe the extra-physical
process of the subjective perception as if it were in reality in the
physical world - i.e., to assign to its parts equivalent physical pro-
cesses in the objective environment, in ordinary space. · · · But
in any case, no matter how far we calculate – to the mercury
vessel, to the scale of the thermometer, to the retina, or into the
brain, at sometime we must say: and this is perceived by the ob-
server. That is, we must always divide the world into two parts,
the one being the observed system, the other being the observer.
In the former, we can follow up all physical processes (in principle
at least) arbitrarily precisely. In the latter, this is meaningless.
The boundary between the two is arbitrary to a very large ex-
tent. That this boundary can be pushed arbitrarily deeply into
the interior of the body of the actual observer is the content of
the principle of psycho-physical parallelism - but this does not
change the fact that in each method of description the boundary
must be put somewhere, if this method is not to proceed vacu-
ously, i.e., if a comparison with experiment is possible. Indeed,
experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has
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made a certain (subjective) observation; and never any like this:
a physical quantity has a certain value. · · ·
Now quantum mechanics describes the events which occur in the
observed portions of the world, so long as they do not interact
with the observing portion, with the aid of process 2. (V.1),
but as soon as such an interaction occurs, i.e., a measurement, it
requires the application of process 1. The dual form is therefore
justified. However, the danger lies in the fact that the principle
of the psycho-physical parallelism is violated, so long as it is not
shown that the boundary between the observed system and the
observer can be displaced arbitrarily (pp. 418-421; emphases
added)
Unfortunately, this is a formulation in which two distinctly different processes
not reducible one to the other, contribute to the overall situation in physics,
with the boundary between them inherently ‘shifty’. Roger Penrose calls
these processes U and R, U standing for unitary evolution and R for reduc-
tion of the state vector [19]. This inherent ambiguity in the very theoretical
foundation of quantum mechanics resulted in the notorious ‘measurement
problem’ or ‘measurement paradox’, a point forcefully made by John Bell
according to whom [20],
The first charge against ‘measurement’, in the fundamental ax-
ioms of quantum mechanics, is that it anchors there the shifty
split of the world into ‘system’ and ‘apparatus’. A second charge
is that the world comes loaded with meaning from everyday life,
meaning which is entirely inappropriate in the quantum context.
In whichever way you look at it, therefore, in Bohr’s way or in von Neumann’s
way or in any of the other ways found in the literature (Dirac, Landau and
Lifshitz, Gottfried, van Kampen) and critiqued by Bell [21], the ambiguity
remains.
It has been argued by some that von Neumann’s ‘projection postulate’ is
not an essential part of quantum mechanics. This view regards the postulate
as an unphysical process and an “optional discarding of certain branches of
the state vector that are expected to be irrelevant for the purpose at hand”
[22] because all statistical predictions of quantum mechanics concerning cor-
related multi-particle systems can be derived without using this postulate. A
careful reading of von Neumann shows that he, too, did not regard ‘process
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1’ as a conventional physical process but rather as an extraphysical process
of subjective perception. But he certainly did not regard it as being optional.
A convincing empirical reason why this process cannot, in fact, be optional
is the occurrence of individual events like spots on photographic plates and
discrete and countable clicks in detectors that are incompatible with purely
unitary evolution of a quantum state. They do occur and eventually pro-
duce the statistical patterns predicted by quantum mechanics in the limit of
indefinitely large numbers of them.
Different points of view regarding quantum mechanics often arise because
physicists adopt fundamentally different philosophical positions regarding
the ontology of the wave function which determines whether one regards the
‘measurement problem’ as a genuine problem of physics or an unnecessary
baggage that can be discarded. For example, Ballentine’s position follows
from his epistemological interpretation of the wave function, namely that
“the state vector is not itself an element of reality, but is only a means to
calculate the probability distributions for various observables”. As Roger
Penrose writes [19]:
It is a common view among many of today’s physicists that quan-
tum mechanics provides us with no picture of ‘reality’ at all! The
formalism of quantum mechanics, on this view, is to be taken
as just that: a mathematical formalism. This formalism, as
many quantum physicists would argue, tells us essentially nothing
about an actual quantum reality of the world, but merely allows
us to compute probabilities for alternative realities that might
occur. Such quantum physicists’ ontology – to the extent that
they would be worried by matters of ‘ontology’ at all – would
be the view (a): that there is simply no reality expressed in the
quantum formalism. At the other extreme, there are many quan-
tum physicists who take the (seemingly) diametrically opposite
view (b): that the unitarily evolving quantum state completely
describes actual reality, with the alarming implication that prac-
tically all quantum alternatives must always continue to exist (in
superposition). · · · the basic difficulty that confronts quantum
physicists, and that drives many of them to such views, is the
conflict between the two quantum processes U and R, · · ·
The last phrase is interesting. To von Neumann ‘process 1’ was fundamen-
tally non-quantum mechanical. So, there is an important difference between
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the way von Neumann viewed his ‘process 1’ and the way Penrose would
prefer to look at his process R.
For other subtle differences between Bohr’s interpretation and the ‘stan-
dard’ interpretations of quantum mechanics see Gomatam [23].
4 THE DOUBLE-SLIT REVISITED
With this background let us now have a closer look at the double-slit ex-
periment and its interpretation in terms of ‘wave-particle duality’ and com-
plementarity. With the two slits open an interpretation of the double-slit
interference pattern in terms of waves would seem to be the most natural
one, and there is total unanimity on this. What about the case in which a
detector is placed immediately after one of the slits, say S1? In this case, the
path of the particle that passes through S1 can be determined with certainty
in 50 per cent of the cases and the double-slit interference pattern on the sec-
ond screen disappears. But what about the pattern created by the other slit
that is unobstructed? How does it look? And what does it tell us? Most text
books are either silent or ambiguous about this. Let us see, for example, how
Richard Feynman describes the situation in his famous Lectures on Physics,
Volume 3. He devotes pages 1398-1431 to a long and detailed account of
the double-slit experiment in various cases illustrated by several figures. The
figures 1-1(b) for bullets, 1-2(b) for water waves, 1-3(b) for electrons, 1-4(b)
for electrons that are being watched, 3-1(b) again for electrons, all look the
same, which is confusing particularly when he makes it clear from the begin-
ning that: “Electrons always arrive in identical lumps” (page 1402). Let us
look at his Fig. 3-4 on page 1431 which is for an “experiment to determine
which hole the electron goes through” and which gives the probabilities for
the electron to arrive at various places on the final screen for three cases. He
says,
First of all, if b is zero – which is the way we would like to design
the apparatus – then the answer is · · · the probability distribution
that you would get if there were only one hole – as shown in the
graph of Fig. 3-4(a).
If one compares Fig. 3-4(a) with Fig. 1-1(b) and Fig. 1-5(b) which show the
distribution curve for classical bullets passing through a double-slit arrange-
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ment, one could infer from their similarity that electrons passing through a
single slit behave like classical bullets.
The fact of the matter, however, is that with only one slit open, what
one observes in experiments, and indeed what quantum mechanics predicts,
is not a distribution pattern similar to that of bullets but a single-slit diffrac-
tion pattern characteristic of waves, a fact nowhere stated or illustrated by
Feynman. There is good reason therefore to emphasize that even with only
one very narrow slit unobstructed in a double-slit arrangement one does not
observe particle-like behaviour of the entire ensemble of electrons or photons.
What one can claim to observe is their particle-like behaviour in 50 per cent
of the cases (in which a particle is detected at one of the slits) and wave-like
behaviour in the other 50 per cent of the cases.
Even this, however, is not the full story because, unlike in the case of
water waves and classical optics, with atomic objects the double-slit inter-
ference pattern and the single-slit diffraction pattern are both built up over
time by individual localized spots created on the screen by the objects –
“Electrons always arrive in identical lumps”, as Feynman emphasizes. In
other words, even in these cases what one observes are only localized spots
which are particle-like. The wave characteristic is reflected in the primacy of
the wave function, the probability amplitude, which follows ‘process 2’ but
is not directly observable! Hence, the Complementarity Principle must be
rephrased for a proper interpretation of the actual experimental conditions.
But before attempting that, let us look at a few interesting variants of the
double-slit experiment.
4.1 Welcher-weg experiments
Rauch and his group initiated a number of experiments in neutron interfer-
ometry [2a and 2b] that are variations of the double-slit experiment with
static (stochastic) and time-dependent (deterministic) absorbers placed in
one path of a neutron interferometer. One of the neutron beams (say the
left beam) is chopped by a rotating toothed wheel, and every time the beam
is totally obstructed by the wheel, the other beam (the right beam) remains
unobstructed (and one has therefore knowledge of which path the neutron
takes), whereas at all other times both the beams propagate unattenuated
and one has no ‘which path’ knowledge. The probability of the event is there-
fore the sum of the separate probabilities for each alternative. The speed of
the chopper is so adjusted that on the average the left beam undergoes the
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same attenuation as in the static case. The intensities in the two cases are
therefore given by
Stochastic
I0 = a|ψL|2 + |ψR|2 + 2
√
aψLψRcosχ (5)
Deterministic
I0 = a|ψL|2 + |ψR|2 + 2aψLψRcosχ (6)
where a is the absorption coefficient (a < 1) and χ the phase difference
between the paths. The observed intensities were in agreement with these
quantum mechanical predictions although intuitively and in classical terms
it is hard to understand why the intensities should be different in the two
cases. What is also remarkable is that even when 99 per cent of the left beam
was blocked, the interference pattern persisted with the same visibility, i.e.,
contrast.
It has been argued that one can generalize the complementarity idea
and give it a quantitative form which would allow one to pass continuously
from particle-like information to wave-like information by using information
theoretic concepts [2c], and that these experiments provide evidence of that
[2d]. Let the initial amplitudes of the two beams be a and let the left beam
amplitude be b after absorption. Then the neutron intensity at one of the
detectors is
I0 = a
2 + b2 + 2ab cos(2kxx+ φ) (7)
where kx is the momentum along the x direction. One can now define two
parameters W and P by
W =
2ab
a2 + b2
= sin2β (8)
P =
a2 − b2
a2 + b2
= cos2β (9)
with a = Rcosβ and b = Rsinβ such that
P 2 +W 2 = 1. (10)
When β = π/4, R =
√
2a =
√
2b and W = 1, one can have no knowledge
of which path the neutron takes which is akin to fully wave-like behaviour.
On the other hand, when there is complete absorption of the left beam,
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b = 0, β = 0 and P = 1. In this case one knows with certainty that the
neutron must have taken the right path, and this is particle-like behaviour.
The claim is that this therefore provides a generalized quantitative expression
for wave-particle complementarity, and one can pass from one extreme to
the other by varying the single parameter β: “The more clearly we wish to
observe the wave nature of light, the more information we must give up about
its particle properties” [2c].
The concept of an entity that is neither fully a wave nor fully a particle is
essentially non-classical, and hence such an interpretation is not encompassed
by Bohr’s wave-particle complementarity interpretation in which the use of
incompatible ‘classical concepts’ in a complementary way is at the core, as
we have seen. The question is whether Bohr’s interpretation is consistent
with these welcher-weg experiments. The answer is ‘yes’ beacuse once ab-
sorption occurs, the ensemble of neutrons is split into two incoherent parts,
one that is absorbed and the rest. The ensemble of unabsorbed neutrons
shows completely wave-like behaviour since their paths through the interfer-
ometer cannot be determined in principle, whereas the ensemble of absorbed
neutrons whose paths can be so determined behaves fully like particles.
Furthermore, as we have seen, with only one of the two slits fully blocked,
what one actually observes is a single-slit diffraction pattern through the
other slit which is open, a feature that is not reflected by the relation P = 1
which is supposed to hold in this case. It is important therefore to note
that the relation (10) is not a consequence of quantum mechanics but is an
interpretation that is added to it.
4.2 Delayed-choice experiments
It is important to bear in mind that when unobserved, particles cannot be
said to have precise trajectories in space-time, at least in the usual Copen-
hagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. As we have seen, this is a con-
sequence of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation which implies that an atomic
object cannot be said to possess simultaneously sharp values of position and
momentum. Hence, it is strictly speaking incorrect to talk about ‘tracing
the path’ of an atomic object in transit. The incongruity of using the classi-
cal concept of a particle to describe an atomic object in transit in quantum
mechanics becomes even more apparent in delayed-choice experiments [3]. A
typical example is a balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer set up in which
one detector Dd is dark (does not record any photons) and the other detector
15
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Fig. 2 A balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer
Db is bright (records all the photons) (Fig. 2). This is because of destructive
interference along the path to the dark detector and constructive interference
along the path to the bright detector. If one talks in terms of photons travel-
ling along routes, one has to admit that each photon travels via both routes
and interferes with itself, which is unreasonable. If the second beam-splitter
is removed, both counters register counts with equal probability. In this case
each photon can be said to travel only one route. However, one can decide
whether to insert the second beam-splitter in place or to take it out only at
the last pecosecond after the photon has already accomplished its travel. In
Wheeler’s words,
We, now, by moving the mirror 3 in or out have an unavoidable
effect on what we have a right to say about the already past
history of that photon.
This is weird and unaccetable, to say the least. As we will see in the last
section, there is no past history of an atomic object in quantum mechanics.
4.3 Quantum Erasures
Another example is the quantum erasure [25]. Let me again quote from
Gribbin’s clear and popular exposition of the double-slit quantum erasure
[9]:
In this variation on the Young’s slit theme, the experiment is
first set up in the usual way, and run to produce interference.
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Quantum theory says that the reason why interference can occur,
even if light is a stream of photons, is that there is no way to find
out, even in principle, which photon went through which slit. The
“indeterminacy” allows fringes to appear.
But then Chiao and his colleagues ran the same experiment with
polarising filters in front of each of the two slits. Any photon
going one way would become “labelled” with left-handed circu-
lar polarization, while any photon going through the other slit is
labelled with right-handed circular polarization. In this version
of the experiment, it is possible in principle to tell which slit any
particular photon arriving at the second screen went through.
Sure enough, the interference pattern vanishes – even though no-
body ever actually looks to see which photon went through which
slit.
Now comes the new trick – the eraser. A third polarising filter is
placed between the two slits and the second screen, to scramble
up (or erase) the information about which photon went through
which hole. Now, once again, it is impossible to tell which path
any particular photon arriving at the second screen took through
the experiment. And, sure enough, the interference pattern reap-
pears!
The strange thing is that interference depends on “single pho-
tons” going through both slits “at once”, but undetected. So
how does a single photon arriving at the first screen know how it
ought to behave in order to match the presence or absence of the
erasing filter on the other side of the slits?
These two examples clearly show that Einstein’s 1905 hypothesis that light is
a stream of photons is hard to reconcile with quantum mechanics. But then
one might legitimately ask, ‘What about the photoelectric and Compton
effects?’ Strange though it may sound, it has been shown that both these
effects can also be explained within quantum mechanics by simply using
the interaction of classical light with quantized atoms in the detectors [26,
27]. A simple model of such a detector is an atom with a ground state |g〉
and a continuum of excited states |e〉 with a gap WT . Let its interaction
Hamiltonian with a classical electromagnetic field be ~E.
~ˆ
D where ~E is the
electric field and
~ˆ
D is the electric dipole operator. Taking ~E = ~E0exp(iωt),
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one obtains the transition rate
d
dt
Pg→e = π
2~
|〈e| ~ˆD|g〉|2E2
0
ρ(e)δ(Ee − Eg − ~ω) (11)
which contains all the features of photoelectricity: the density of states ρ(e)
vanishes if Ee−Eg < WT , and the final energy of the system is Ee = Eg+~ω,
and hence the kinetic energy of the emitted electron is ~ω −WT . There is
therefore no logical necessity to introduce the concept of the photon to explain
these phenomena.
It is only fairly recently that the truly quantum nature of light is beginning
to be observed definitively through the production of very special states of
light like single-photon states and squeezed states [28]. Such states can be
properly described only in quantum optics which has a different theoretical
structure.4 Even there the ontology of the quanta (photons) and the field is
a controversial issue [29].
5 CONCLUSIONS
In all these examples of particle interpretation of the double-slit experiment
and its variants there is an implicit assumption that “an exact description
of the past path of a particle” is possible in quantum mechanics. Recall
Bohr’s statement quoted in Section 2 that “it is only the circumstance that
we are presented with a choice of either tracing the path of a particle or
observing interference effects, which allows us to escape from the paradoxical
necessity of concluding that the behaviour of an electron or a photon should
depend on the presence of a slit in the diaphragm through which it could
be proved not to pass”. That “tracing the path of a particle” is a classical
hangover which quantum mechanics does not permit was first made clear in a
paper of Einstein, Tolman and Podolsky [24] in which they showed that “the
principles of quantum mechanics involve an uncertainty in the description
of past events, which is analogous to the uncertainty in the prediction of
future events”. They showed this by applying the time-energy uncertainty
relation to a simple set up in which a pair of particles is released from a
box containing identical particles in thermal agitation in two directions by
means of a shutter. The box is accurately weighed before and after the
shutter opens, and one particle travels directly to an observer while the other
particle travels a much longer path and is reflected by a parabolic mirror to
18
the observer. The observer measures the momentum of the first particle and
then observes its time of arrival. Although the measurement of momentum
will change the momentum in an unknown manner, nevertheless knowing its
past momentum, and hence its velocity and energy, it would appear possible
to know the time when the shutter opened, and hence to calculate the velocity
and energy of the second particle from the known loss in the energy content of
the box when the shutter opened. It should then be possible to predict both
the energy and the time of arrival of the second particle, which is paradoxical
because of the time-energy uncertainty relation. The paradox is resolved by
noting that the past motion of the particle cannot be accurately determined
as assumed. No wonder then that despite much effort Einstein was “unable
to achieve the sharp formulation of Bohr’s principle of complementarity”.
The plain truth according to quantum mechanics is therefore that only
‘process 2’ holds between the source and the detector wherever that may be
placed at whatever time during the course of the experiment, and ‘process
1’ (or its effective equivalent) takes over only at the place and time of final
detection, generating only ‘which place’ or particle-like information. Thus,
the localized spots (spots on photographic plates or positions of clicking
detectors, for example) are the only directly observable features of atomic
objects – their in principle unobservable propagation between the source and
the detector (‘process 2’) can, if one insists on employing classical concepts,
be interpreted as being wave-like. The two processes of Schro¨dinger evolu-
tion (wave-like propagation) and localized detection (collapse or its effective
equivalent) are sequential and complementary in the same experiment – they
are mutually exclusive but together they give an exhaustive account of all
observable phenomena. Thus, one can maintain both the classical wave con-
cept and the classical particle concept in every conceivable experiment, but
never both of them simultaneously, only sequentially in time and with the
wave only as an inference from the statistical pattern of the observed spots.
It is only when wave-particle duality and complementarity are stated in this
manner that they appear as obvious elements of a consistent interpretation
of standard quantum mechanics.
It is clear from all this that somehow an extraneous intervention on uni-
tary evolution is required for quantum mechanics not to be vacuous, i.e.,
devoid of observable phenomena, because there are no ‘closed’ atomic phe-
nomena without irreversible detection and amplification [30], and the latter
processes cannot be a unitary quantum mechanical process like ‘process 2’.
Depending on one’s choice, this intervention can be taken to be either von
Neumann’s ‘process 1’ or Penrose’s process R or the postulated classicality
of the measuring instruments a la Bohr or something else. The necessity of
such an intervention, whatever that might be, constitutes the “central” and
“only” mystery of standard quantum mechanics.
A number of proposals with different ontologies have been put forward
to get round this mystery, this shifty split between the observer and the ob-
served, the most well-known among them being the de Broglie-Bohm causal
interpretation in terms of hidden variables [4], Feynman’s path-integral for-
malism [5], the so-called many worlds interpretation [6] with its implications
for quantum cosmology [31] and quantum computing [32], the consistent his-
tories approach [7] and decoherence [8] and Penrose’s proposal that gravity
may have a role in quantum state reduction [19]. It will be going beyond the
scope of this paper to dwell on them.
Let me end with the following provocative and tongue-in-cheek quotation
from Bell [33]:
ORDINARY QUANTUM MECHANICS (as far as I know) IS
JUST FINE FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES. ... So it is
convenient to have an abbreviation for the last phrase: FOR ALL
PRACTICAL PURPOSES = FAPP. ...
Is it not good to know what follows from what, even if it is not
really necessary FAPP? Suppose for example that quantum me-
chanics were found to resist precise formulation. Suppose that
when formulation beyond FAPP is attempted, we find an un-
movable finger obstinately pointing outside the subject, to the
mind of the observer, to the Hindu scriptures, to God, or even
only Gravitation? Would not that be very, very interesting?
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Notes
1. This is a Cartesian split. According to Descartes ‘matter’ and ‘mind’ are
essentially different substances, the defining attribute of matter being
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spatial ‘extension’ and that of mind ‘self-awareness’ and ‘thought’. Mind is
therefore non-physical. He famously wrote, cogito ergo sum (I think,
therefore I am). In his Meditations he says: “... the human mind is shown
to be really distinct from the body, and, nevertheless, to be so closely
conjoined therewith, as together to form, as it were, a unity” (John Veitch
Translation of 1901).
2. Here the word ‘subjective’ must be understood in the sense of being
intersubjectively valid to avoid solipsism.
3. The word ‘mirror’ is to be understood here to refer to the ‘half-silvered
mirror’ or the second beam-splitter.
4. Such states are defined by a useful convention based on the weight
function in the Sudarshan diagonal representation. All photon states and
quantized radiation field states are quantum in nature – we separate them
for convenience into what we call ‘classical’ and ‘non-classical’. – N.
Mukunda (private communication)
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